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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3940 
___________ 
 
MARY J. SCOTT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FAYE RIVA COHEN, ESQUIRE; DAVID OH, ESQUIRE; JEFFREY D. SNYDER, 
ESQUIRE; BRUCE M. LUDWIG, ESQUIRE; LARRY PITT, ESQUIRE; HOWARD G. 
HOPKIRK, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; SUE ANN UNGER, SENIOR 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; MARY KAY HENRY, SERVICES EMPLOYEES 
INTERNATIONAL UNION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 12-cv-03252) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jan  E. Dubois 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2013 
Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR. and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 13, 2013) 
  ___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Pro se appellant Mary Scott filed a complaint in the District Court against her 
former counsel, Faye Riva Cohen.  Scott had sustained a work-related injury in 1999.  
From 2002 to 2003, Cohen represented Scott in related unsuccessful employment 
litigation, including a worker‟s compensation claim before the Workers‟ Compensation 
Appeals Board.  Cohen was also allegedly involved in Scott‟s federal suit against the 
Department of Public Welfare (DPW).
1
  In 2008, Cohen obtained a judgment in 
Pennsylvania state court against Scott for unpaid legal fees and, in May 2012, obtained a 
writ of execution on that judgment.  The underlying complaint appears to allege, inter 
alia, that the writ was falsely obtained.  In addition to Cohen, it names numerous 
defendants who were allegedly involved in various ways in the worker‟s compensation 
claim process or resulting litigation including, among others, two Deputy Attorney 
Generals who had represented the DPW and the president of the Service Employees 
International Union. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint against each defendant with prejudice 
and Scott appealed.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the dismissal of Scott‟s claims.  See Ill. Nat‟l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2011).   
                                              
1
 The federal suit was dismissed with prejudice.  See Scott v. Pa. Dep‟t of Public Welfare, 
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 02-3799).  The docket indicates that Scott proceeded pro se, but she 
claims that Cohen filed the case and seeks relief against Cohen for the “unwarranted 
dismissal of [the] federal case.” 
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  Scott‟s complaint purports to allege various violations of her rights.  As the 
District Court noted, the rambling, often incoherent complaint contains few discernible  
claims against the defendants.  Although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, 
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), they must state a “plausible claim for 
relief to survive[ ] a motion to dismiss.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).   
Scott‟s complaint presents a threshold problem of jurisdiction.  Federal jurisdiction is 
determined from the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.  See Nationwide 
Mut.Fire Ins. Co. v. T & D Cottage Auto Parts and Serv., Inc., 705 F.2d 685, 688 (3d Cir. 
1983).  As best can be determined, the complaint sought $1 million dollars against each 
of the defendants for claims of legal malpractice and fraud.  There appears to be no 
diversity jurisdiction to support these state law claims.
2
  See Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. 
Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010).  Moreover, even if jurisdiction did lie, as 
the District Court noted, it is clear that the claims are beyond the statute of limitations.  
Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim is two 
years if the claim is grounded in negligence and four years if the claim is premised upon 
a breach of contract.  See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565, 571 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2007).   The actions which would give rise to any conceivable malpractice 
claim occurred from 2002 to 2003 and are thus time-barred.  Also, under Pennsylvania 
law, claims for fraud are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.  United Nat‟l Ins. 
                                              
2
  Defendant Cohen asserts in her motion to dismiss that, like Scott, she is a resident of 
Pennsylvania.    
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Co. v. J.H. France Refractories Co., 668 A.2d 120, 121 (Pa. 1995).   Although the writ of 
execution appears to have prompted this litigation, it is Cohen‟s actions in 2008 in 
obtaining the underlying judgment that were allegedly fraudulent; such a claim would 
clearly be time-barred.  The remaining defendants‟ involvement, if any, was clearly 
outside the statute of limitations. 
In her response to Cohen‟s motion to dismiss, Scott alleged several bases for her 
claims, including “violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, protected through 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under state law, for breach of contract and tortious interference 
with contractual relations, and violating state and federal laws.”   Even if these theories of 
liability had been included in her complaint, the outcome would be no different.  See 
Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989) (“It is a basic principle that 
the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).  
As the District Court noted, there were no factual allegations to support any § 1983 
violations by any of the defendants.  The facts in the response were no more developed 
than the insufficient allegations in the complaint.  Furthermore, Scott‟s conclusory 
statements were insufficient to enable a court to draw a reasonable inference that the 
defendants were indeed liable for any of the misconduct that she alleged.  See Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678 (“„naked assertions‟ devoid of „further factual enhancement‟” do not establish 
grounds for relief) (citation omitted).   Noting the frivolous nature of the claims, the 
District Court properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).    
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s dismissal of the 
complaint.  Appellees‟ Henry and Ludwig‟s motion for permission and acceptance to file 
separate briefs or, alternatively, to file one brief, and motions to supplement the appendix 
are granted.   
